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The Sensitivity of the CDS Market to Financial Analysts’ Forecast Revisions 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the impact of analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) and cash flow per share (CPS) 
forecast revisions on the market for credit default swaps. Earnings and cash flows directly affect 
the level of firm assets and equity, and prior theoretical and empirical work demonstrates they are 
important factors in the determination of credit spreads. Accordingly, if analysts’ forecasts and 
forecast revisions represent new and unexpected information, credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
are likely to respond. We find that while the issuance of both EPS and CPS forecast revisions relate 
inversely with changes in CDS spreads, cash flow forecast revisions have a larger effect, on 
average. We also find that the relationship between CPS forecast revisions and CDS spreads tends 
to be stronger in cases of financial distress. Furthermore, we do not observe an immediate 
significant reaction in the CDS market to analysts’ recommendation changes. Our study provides 
evidence that cash flow forecasts dominate earnings forecasts in some situations and that 
participants in the CDS market discriminate between forms of analyst output.  
 
Keywords: Forecast revisions, Earnings per share, Cash flow per share, Credit default swap. 
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The Sensitivity of the CDS Market to Financial Analysts’ Forecast Revisions 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Accounting data are theoretically value-relevant for pricing credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads (Duffie and Lando, 2001). Firms’ earnings and cash flow data are particularly important 
since they provide critical information relative to both firm value and bankruptcy risk. Callen et 
al. (2009) and Das et al. (2009) empirically show that accounting earnings affect CDS spreads. In 
addition to actual earnings, prior research demonstrates that the CDS market reacts to information 
regarding expectations of future earnings as well. For instance, Shivakumar et al. (2011) find that 
management earnings forecasts impact credit spreads, particularly when news is bad or firms have 
poor credit ratings. We extend this area of study by focusing on the effect of sell-side financial 
analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecast revisions on credit default swap spreads. 
Long a topic of equity market research (e.g., Lys and Sohn, 1990; Francis and Soffer, 1997; 
Gleason and Lee, 2003), the debt market implications of analyst forecast and recommendation 
revisions have received comparatively less attention in the literature. A small number of studies 
examine reactions in the bond market to financial analyst output (e.g., Khurana and Raman, 2003; 
Edmonds et al., 2011). However the relative infrequency of bond trading often limits these studies 
to issuance events. The comparative high liquidity of the CDS market, and the speed with which 
it responds to new information (Longstaff et al., 2005; Acharya and Johnson, 2007), makes it a 
desirable environment in which to examine credit-market impacts of analysts’ forecasts.  
Since future earnings and cash flows directly affect the level of firm assets and equity 
(through the clean surplus relation), they are important factors in the determination of credit 
spreads (Callen et al., 2009; Das et al., 2009). Higher future income and cash flow increase 
expected firm value and reduce default probability. If analysts’ forecasts and revisions of these 
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measures represent new and unexpected information about default risk and uncertainty, CDS 
spreads are likely to respond. Specifically, we expect earnings and cash flow forecast revisions to 
relate inversely with changes in CDS spreads. For example, an upward earnings forecast revision 
reflects an increased likelihood of higher future income and cash flow, increasing the probability 
of greater firm wealth and asset values, and correspondingly decreasing the probability of default. 
Thus, we expect a decline in CDS spreads around the release date of an upward revision of 
earnings. We further posit that cash flow forecast revisions may be more relevant than earnings 
forecast revisions to the CDS market because bond interest and principal at maturity must be paid 
in cash, and it is the failure to meet these payments which triggers a default event.1  
Francis and Soffer (1997) show a greater impact of earnings forecast revisions on equity 
markets for “buy” or “strong buy” than non-buy recommendations. Francis and Soffer (1997) 
attribute this asymmetry to the former representing imprecise valuation measures, motivating 
market participants to rely more on other types of information when issued. We investigate 
whether a similar phenomenon exists in the CDS market, but refrain from making a directional 
prediction due to structural differences between debt and equity markets.2 We also examine the 
impact of credit ratings and the financial crisis on the forecast revision-CDS spread relationship as 
these situations reflect heightened uncertainty. We predict that cash flow forecast revisions impact 
CDS spreads more than earnings forecast revisions for firms with non-investment grade credit 
ratings as well as during the recent financial crisis. We test our hypotheses using a model adapted 
from Shivakumar et al. (2011).  
                                                     
1 Credit events may vary by contract but typically include bankruptcy, obligation default, failure to pay, and 
restructuring. See Blanco et al. (2005) for additional information.  
2 Debt instruments lack the call-option structure of equity claims (e.g., Jensen and Smith, 1984) and debt markets have 
a lower verification threshold for bad news than for good news (DeFond and Zhang, 2014). 
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The results largely support our hypotheses. We find a strong negative relation between 
CDS spread changes and the release of both analyst earnings and cash flow forecast revisions. 
Further, we find on average that the CDS market responds more strongly to cash flow forecast 
revisions than earnings forecast revisions. Earnings, though not cash flow, forecast revisions 
matter more when firms have a “buy” or “strong buy” rating from analysts. On the other hand, a 
relatively stronger negative relation exists between cash flow forecast revisions and CDS spreads 
for firms with non-investment grade credit ratings. We also find the CDS market reacts more to 
cash flow forecast revisions than earnings forecast revisions for all firms during the recent financial 
crisis. Overall, our pattern of results suggests that the CDS market increasingly values cash flow 
forecast revisions relative to earnings forecast revisions as firms experience poorer financial 
health.  
Finally, we examine whether analyst recommendation (buy/hold/sell) changes impact CDS 
spreads upon announcement. Interestingly, we fail to find a statistically significant link. The CDS 
market thus appears selective in pricing information from analysts. However, this is in line with 
prior research questioning the usefulness of analysts’ recommendations (e.g., Barniv et al., 2009; 
Simon and Curtis, 2011; Ertimur et al., 2011), especially for sophisticated investors (Malmendier 
and Shanthikumar, 2014).     
We contribute to prior literature by identifying the impact of financial analysts on an 
increasingly-important CDS market. We demonstrate that analysts’ forecast revisions generate 
predictable movements in CDS spreads. By filling this gap, we paint a more-complete picture of 
financial analysts’ impact on credit markets. While previous work in equity markets generally 
finds that cash flow forecasts tend to be less important than earnings forecasts (Givoly et al., 2009; 
Call et al., 2013), our research suggests that cash flow forecast revisions can be more informative 
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than earnings forecast revisions. Furthermore, we show the importance of cash flow forecasts 
increases during periods of financial distress. Together these results provide further evidence of 
the sophistication and relevance of cash flow forecasts (e.g., Call et al., 2013). We also 
demonstrate that the CDS market does not value all forms of analyst output equally: we do not 
observe an association between recommendation revisions and immediate significant changes in 
CDS spreads. Our findings broadly align with the conclusions of Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2014) that earnings forecasts and revisions are directed more at large, sophisticated investors (the 
primary players in the CDS market), while recommendations are targeted at retail investors. 
Our paper continues as follows. Relevant literature is reviewed and hypotheses are 
developed in section 2. We present our models and data in section 3 and regression results and 
additional analyses in section 4. Section 5 summarizes our findings and concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Credit Default Swaps Background 
Credit default swaps operate as insurance on the bonds of an issuing company.3 In a CDS 
contract, a protection buyer (the holder of the bond, or possibly another market participant betting 
against a company’s ability to repay its bond obligations) makes quarterly payments to a seller 
offering protection against default. The cost of the insurance premium is referred to as the ‘spread’ 
and is typically described in terms of basis points. For example, a protection buyer for a reference 
entity with a CDS spread of 100 basis points would make quarterly payments of $25,000 (0.0100/4 
x $10,000,000; ten million dollars being a typical bond issuance amount) to a protection seller. If 
                                                     
3 Current gross notional value of the CDS market is approximately $12 trillion 
(http://www.swapsinfo.org/charts/swaps/notional-outstanding, accessed July 21st 2016). The CDS market peaked 
with a gross notional value of $58 trillion in 2007 (Griffin, 2014). Dias (2015) argues the surge in the CDS market 
was a consequence of managerial self-interest and risk taking in the early 2000s. She attributes the marked decline in 
the size of the market to the failure of financial institutions to act as market makers and a retreat from risk-taking in 
general.  
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a credit event occurs upon which the parties have previously contracted (e.g., failure to pay, 
bankruptcy, unfavorable debt restructuring), the protection seller pays the protection buyer the face 
value of the bonds and the buyer delivers the bonds to the protection seller. If the buyer has a naked 
CDS position (i.e., the buyer does not hold the underlying bonds), a credit event results in a payout 
of the difference between the current and face value of the bond.4  
2.2. Related Literature on Analysts’ Forecasts of Earnings and Cash Flows 
Analysts make forecasts of firms’ earnings and cash flows and revise their forecasts based 
on new information obtained from public and private sources. Financial analysts’ earnings forecast 
revisions have long been shown to have information value for equity markets (e.g., Givoly and 
Lakonishok, 1979, 1980; Imhoff and Lobo, 1984). Recent research regarding the impact of 
analysts on the equity market provides evidence that both analyst leaders and followers play 
important roles in the price discovery process (Cooper et al., 2001; Shroff et al., 2014; Keskek et 
al., 2014).  
Analyst cash flow forecasts are a relatively recent innovation.5  DeFond and Hung (2003) 
find that analysts tend to provide cash flow forecasts in response to investor demand and when 
earnings are of lower quality. While Givoly et al. (2009) argue that analysts’ cash flow forecasts 
are mere naïve extensions of their earnings forecasts, most other research concludes that cash flow 
forecasts are at least moderately sophisticated (DeFond and Hung, 2003; Call et al., 2009; McInnis 
and Collins, 2011; Pae and Yoon, 2012; Brown et al., 2013; Call et al., 2013). Givoly et al. (2009) 
find only a weak association between cash flow forecasts and stock returns, but Call et al. (2013) 
                                                     
4 See Griffin (2014) for a thorough literature review of studies concerned with the relation between the CDS market 
and the disclosure and transparency of accounting information, as well as a detailed example of the calculation of 
credit spreads from assumed inputs. 
5 The first year for which I/B/E/S provides cash flow forecasts is 1993.  
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provide more robust evidence that cash flow forecast revisions are significant in explaining 
abnormal equity returns, even after controlling for earnings forecast revisions.6    
Research also demonstrates financial analysts impact bond markets. Their activity is linked 
with lower bond yield spreads, especially when firm idiosyncratic risk is high (Mansi et al., 2011), 
and Khurana and Raman (2003) find a negative association between earnings forecast revisions 
and yields for new bond issues. Financial analysts’ cash flow forecasts serve as important 
benchmarks in the bond market; meeting or beating these forecasts tends to improve bond ratings 
and decrease initial bond yields (Edmonds et al., 2011). However, the bond market poses 
challenges to researchers. First, bonds trade relatively infrequently and prices and yields typically 
react slowly to new information (Longstaff et al., 2005; Acharya and Johnson, 2007).7 Second, 
determining the credit spread from a given bond yield requires assumptions about the underlying 
risk-free rate (Hull et al., 2004); and third, bond yields are also a function of idiosyncratic bond 
features such as covenants and warrants.  
Using the market for credit default swaps to examine the impact of analysts on credit 
markets offers a way around these difficulties. The relation between financial analysts’ output and 
the CDS market is relatively unexplored in the accounting literature. Although Batta et al. (2016) 
find the initiation of CDS trading increases analyst forecast accuracy and decreases dispersion, to 
the best of our knowledge there is no existing study that directly examines the impact of analyst 
forecast revisions on the CDS market. 
2.3. Hypotheses Development      
                                                     
6 In a replication of Call et al. (2013), we also find that both earnings and cash flow forecast revisions are significant 
in explaining short-window (5-day) residual equity market returns. Similar to Call et al. (2013), we observe a larger 
coefficient on the earnings forecast revision term.   
7 Blanco et al. (2005) demonstrate enhanced liquidity in the CDS market: new information is priced faster in CDS 
spreads than corporate bond prices.   
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Duffie and Lando (2001) model credit spreads as a hybrid structural model combining 
imperfect accounting information. They find accounting information is important in modelling 
term structures of credit spreads. While the Duffie and Lando (2001) model is general in that it 
does not employ a specific type of accounting data, earnings and cash flow are appealing to 
operationalize empirically because of their relation to firm wealth and asset dynamics through the 
clean surplus relation (Callen et al., 2009). Further, the generality of the Duffie and Lando (2001) 
model suggests that credible expectations regarding accounting information may be as important 
as ex post realized numbers.8 Provided forecasted earnings inform market participants by causing 
those participants to revise their priors, new information regarding estimated future earnings and 
cash flows should be incorporated in CDS spreads. Specifically, we expect an inverse relation 
between CDS spread changes and analysts’ earnings and cash flow forecast revisions. For instance, 
an upward revision reflects higher future income and cash flow, which increases probable future 
firm wealth, asset values, and ability to service debt. In turn, this reduces the likelihood of default; 
we would therefore expect a decline in CDS spreads around the release date of an upward forecast 
revision.  
Multiple empirical studies demonstrate the responsiveness of the CDS market to realized 
earnings and cash flow information (Callen et al., 2009; Das et al., 2009; Batta, 2011). There is 
also evidence that expectations regarding earnings are priced in the CDS market. Kraft et al. (2011) 
show CDS spreads capture the intra-industry earnings announcement effect of firms disclosing 
earnings news on firms which have not yet announced their earnings under certain conditions. 
Additionally, in a similar study to our own, Shivakumar et al. (2011) report that CDS spreads 
                                                     
8 Research from equity markets provides evidence that analyst forecast revisions (i.e., expectations about earnings) 
may be more informative than actual earnings. Elton et al. (1981) finds larger abnormal returns can be achieved with 
a perfect foreknowledge of analyst revision behavior than with a foreknowledge of actual earnings.   
8 
 
respond to management earnings forecasts and that the reaction in the financial crisis period is 
stronger than in the pre-financial crisis period.9  
We also predict that, on average, cash flow forecast revisions may have a higher 
information value to the CDS market relative to earnings forecast revisions. Though prior research 
suggests the association between cash flow forecast revisions and equity market reactions is 
weaker than that between earnings forecast revisions and equity markets (Givoly et al., 2009; Call 
et al., 2013), we expect a stronger inverse CDS market reaction to cash flow forecast revisions. 
This is due to the importance of the cash component of earnings for meeting bond interest and 
principal obligations. To take a straightforward example, accrued earnings resulting from revenue-
recognizing transactions involving promises to pay the reference entity would not aid that 
reference entity in making principal and interest payments immediately; it is not until accrued 
earnings are received in cash that they are useful for meeting these obligations. As a result, earnings 
as a whole may be less informative than cash flow in determining credit risk spreads, and the CDS 
market is likely to be more sensitive to cash flow forecast revisions than earnings forecast 
revisions.10 Formally, we hypothesize in alternate form: 
H1a: Forecasted earnings per share revisions are inversely associated with CDS spread changes.  
 
H1b: Forecasted cash flow per share revisions are inversely associated with CDS spread changes. 
 
H1c: There is a stronger inverse association between cash flow per share forecast revisions and 
CDS spread changes than earnings per share forecast revisions and CDS spread changes. 
 
Additionally, we predict that the informativeness of forecast revisions may depend on the 
prevailing analyst recommendation. As found by Francis and Soffer (1997), forecast revisions may 
                                                     
9 In a discussion of Shivakumar et al. (2011), Lok and Richardson (2011) build a framework to link asset pricing 
research from debt and equity markets.  
10 We do not necessarily expect cash flow forecast revisions to entirely subsume the effects of earnings forecast 
revisions. Earnings forecast revisions, comprised of both cash flows and accruals, are likely to still be significant due 
to the predictive power of earnings and accruals in forecasting future cash flows (Dechow, 1994).  
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matter more for “buy” and “strong buy” recommendations as they represent an imprecise valuation 
measure. Distributional analyses indicate that “buy” recommendations outnumber “hold” and 
“sell” recommendations. This is typically held to be a function of the tendency of analysts to cover 
more successful firms and workplace pressure to issue favorable news about clients (McNichols 
and O’Brien, 1997; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ertimur et al., 2011). As a result, a buy rating 
may be less informative regarding future firm prospects than hold or sell ratings. Accordingly, in 
the presence of a buy rating, market participants could tend to seek out other kinds of information 
such as analyst forecasts. However, debt markets have been shown to be conservative in that the 
value of debt holders’ claims are more sensitive to bad news than good news – debt instruments 
lack the call-option structure of equity claims (e.g., Jensen and Smith, 1984). As such debt markets 
do not generally require as high a verification threshold for bad news as for good news (DeFond 
and Zhang, 2014) and so may not be more sensitive to news regarding the earnings of firms with 
better recommendations. Therefore, we do not predict a direction for the interaction of the analyst 
forecast revision and prevailing recommendation and state our second hypothesis in null form:  
H2a: There is no difference in the association between forecasted earnings per share revisions 
and CDS spread changes when the current recommendation is “buy” or “strong buy” relative to 
other recommendations.  
 
H2b: There is no difference in the association between forecasted cash flow per share revisions 
and CDS spread changes when the current recommendation is “buy” or “strong buy” relative to 
other recommendations. 
 
 
 We also predict that firms with non-investment grade credit ratings will be more sensitive 
to cash flow forecast revisions than earnings forecast revisions. As Lok and Richardson (2011) 
note, the reaction of CDS spreads to cash flow forecast revisions should be larger for firms that 
are nearer to default (as measured by the value of assets relative to debt outstanding). This situation 
is also similar to what occurred during the financial crisis, when the expected default frequency 
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jumped six-fold between 2007 and 2008 (Lok and Richardson, 2011). Furthermore, as this default 
point approaches, the importance of cash, relative to earnings as a whole, is likely to increase. 
Eisdorfer (2007) finds the importance of cash flow news grows in determining stock returns as the 
possibility of financial distress increases. As a result, we also hypothesize a stronger relationship 
between CDS spread changes and cash flow forecast revisions relative to earnings forecast 
revisions for firms with lower credit ratings and for all firms during the financial crisis. Our third 
set of hypotheses in alternate form is stated below:  
H3a: The inverse association between cash flow forecast revisions and CDS spread changes is 
stronger than that between earnings forecast revisions and CDS spread changes for firms with 
non-investment grade ratings.  
 
H3b: The inverse association between cash flow forecast revisions and CDS spread changes is 
stronger than that between earnings forecast revisions and CDS spread changes for firms during 
the financial crisis.  
 
 
3. Models and Sample Description 
3.1. Models 
 We utilize models adapted from Shivakumar et al. (2011) to test H1a and H1b: 
ΔCDSj,t = β0 + β1Yj,t + β2σ(CDS)j,t + β3σ(RET)j,t + β4RESIDRETj,t + β5SP500RETt + β6ΔTREASt + 
β7ΔVIXt + β8GOODNEWSj,t + β9BADNEWSj,t + β10-21(YEAR_DUM)t + εj,t  (1a-1b) 
where Y represents EFR in model (1a) and CFR in (1b). To test H1c we include both EFR and CFR 
simultaneously: 
ΔCDSj,t = β0 + β1EFRj,t + β2CFRj,t + β3σ(CDS)j,t + β4σ(RET)j,t + β5RESIDRETj,t + β6SP500RET t + 
β7ΔTREASt + β8ΔVIXt + β9GOODNEWSj,t + β10BADNEWSj,t + β11-22(YEAR_DUM)t + εj,t  
                   (1c) 
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The dependent variable is the percentage change in five-year maturity CDS spreads for 
firm j at time t over a five-day window around the forecast revision announcement date from  
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S), adjusted for the average percentage change for 
all CDS spreads with the same implied rating as firm j. This operation helps to ensure that the 
change observed in the CDS spread of interest is due to firm-specific events and not a result of 
market-wide changes. CDS spreads and implied rating data come from Markit. 
 Our independent variables of interest for models (1a-1c) are the average daily analyst 
forecasted annual earnings per share (EPS) revision (EFR) and the average daily analyst forecasted 
annual cash flow per share (CPS) revision (CFR), with the revisions expressed as percentages, for 
firm j at time t. In the construction of these variables we average all analyst revisions of forecasted 
annual EPS and CPS made on the same day for the same firm to obtain calculated daily changes. 
We source analyst information from I/B/E/S. Next, we match revision days (day 0) with the daily 
CDS data and build five-day CDS spread change windows around this date ([-2, 2]).11  
 Following Zhang et al. (2009) and Shivakumar et al. (2011) we include a number of control 
variables shown to be associated with short-term changes in CDS spreads. The standard deviation 
of CDS spreads (σ(CDS)) and standard deviation of market-adjusted stock returns (σ(RET)) control 
for CDS and equity volatility and are calculated over the period of day -137 through day -6 relative 
to the revision date. We control for the level of the market-adjusted return (RESIDRET) over the 
five-day period surrounding the revision date. Returns data come from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP).   
                                                     
11 Specifically, we first manually match Markit CDS data to Compustat based on an analysis of firm name. In the 
event of ambiguity we conservatively omit the entity from our sample. We then merge with I/B/E/S data using the 
GVKEY-I/B/E/S ticker linking tables provided through Wharton Research Data Services.   
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 We also include key macroeconomic variables which influence the CDS spread over our 
five-day window of interest: SP500RET is the cumulative return in the S&P 500 index, also 
obtained from CRSP; ΔTREAS is the percentage change in the three-month Treasury bill rate; data 
are obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data website.12 ΔVIX is the change in the S&P 
500 implied volatility index and is available on the website of the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange.13 
 We control for ratings announcements by Standard and Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s. 
GOODNEWS (BADNEWS) is an indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if an 
observation experiences an actual credit rating upgrade (downgrade), is placed on a positive 
(negative) ratings watch, or receives a positive (negative) outlook on the forecast revision date. 
Credit ratings data are obtained from Factiva and year controls are added to all regressions.  
 We estimate the following model to test our second and third hypotheses: 
ΔCDSj,t = β0 + β1Yj,t + β2Yj,t*Zj,t + β3Zj,t+ β4σ(CDS_SPREAD)j,t + β5σ(RET_SPREAD)j,t + 
β6RESIDRETj,t + β7SP500RETt + β8ΔTREASt + β9ΔVIXt + β10GOODNEWSj,t + 
β11BADNEWSj,t + β12-23(YEAR_DUM)t + εj,t                    (2-4) 
where Y represents EFR in (2a), (3a), and (4a) and CFR in (2b), (3b), and (4b). Models (3c) and 
(4c) include both EFR and CFR and their interaction terms. Z represents the dichotomous variable 
BUY in (2a) and (2b); JUNK in (3a), (3b), and (3c); and CRISIS in (4a), (4b), and (4c).14   
                                                     
12 Data available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/ 
13 Data available at http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/historical.aspx 
14 Specifically, we estimate the following models (controls and subscripts omitted for conciseness): 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1EFR + β2EFR *BUY + β3BUY + Controls + ε      (2a) 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1CFR + β2CFR *BUY + β3BUY + Controls + ε      (2b) 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1EFR + β2EFR *JUNK + β3JUNK + Controls + ε     (3a) 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1CFR + β2CFR *JUNK + β3JUNK + Controls + ε     (3b) 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1EFR + β2EFR *JUNK + β3CFR + β4CFR *JUNK + β5JUNK + Controls + ε  (3c) 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1EFR + β2EFR *CRISIS + β3CRISIS + Controls + ε     (4a) 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1CFR + β2CFR *CRISIS + β3CRISIS + Controls + ε     (4b) 
ΔCDS = β0 + β1EFR + β2EFR *CRISIS + β3CFRj,t + β4CFRj,t*CRISIS + β5CRISIS + Controls + ε  (4c) 
13 
 
BUY is a binary variable that takes a value of one if the firm currently has an average rating 
of “buy” or better from all analysts following the firm and zero otherwise. JUNK is a binary 
variable that takes a value of one (zero otherwise) if an observation has an implied non-investment 
grade credit rating. CRISIS is a binary variable that takes a value of one (zero otherwise) for 
observations between the fourth quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2009.  
3.2. Sample Selection and Description 
Our sample period covers the years 2001 through 2012. We first obtain analyst forecast 
data from I/B/E/S for firms with available CDS data. This results in 546,470 EPS forecasts and 
115,355 CPS forecasts. We next calculate revisions in the two metrics made for a given firm by a 
given analyst for both EPS and CPS forecasts, providing an initial sample of 391,024 earnings and 
85,048 cash flow firm-analyst-day forecast revisions. Finally, we average the forecast revisions by 
day if more than one analyst following a given firm revises their forecast on the same day. We 
obtain 237,377 average daily earnings forecast revisions and 62,412 average daily cash flow 
forecast revisions.15  
We utilize CDS data provided by Markit, which provides composite CDS spreads that are 
based on daily closing bid and ask prices obtained from market makers, for US non-financial 
reference entities. In our primary analyses, and similar to Zhang et al. (2009) and Shivakumar et 
al. (2011), we use CDS data for contracts with a five-year maturity because of their enhanced 
liquidity. Our sample consists of CDS contracts on senior debt issues with modified restructuring 
clauses. After matching with available daily CDS data and control variables, our final sample 
                                                     
15 The majority of our daily forecast revision observations are the result of a single analyst revising his or her forecast.  
Single-analyst-firm earnings (cash flow) forecast revision days comprise 67 per cent (52 per cent) of our total firm-
day observations.     
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consists of 126,365 daily earnings forecast revisions (for 628 unique firms) and 31,932 daily cash 
flow forecast revisions (for 523 unique firms).16  
Table 1 presents sample descriptive statistics. The median values of change in CDS spread 
and EPS and CPS forecast revisions (EFR, CFR) each approximately equal zero. We recode 
average consensus recommendation (MeanRec) so that 5 represents a “strong buy” and 1 
represents a “strong sell.” The MeanRec is 3.632, consistent with prior research indicating a 
propensity for analysts to issue buy recommendations (e.g., Ertimur et al. 2011). The mean change 
in T-bill rates and VIX, as well as stock and S&P500 returns, calculated over the five-day window 
of interest are also approximately zero.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Table 2 indicates a negative correlation between changes in CDS spreads and EPS forecast 
revisions, CPS forecast revisions, and recommendation changes, although the Pearson correlation 
between CDS spread changes and EPS forecast revisions is not significant at conventional levels. 
Correlation coefficients between control variables are low, indicating an absence of 
multicollinearity. Observed correlations are broadly intuitive. For example, the correlation 
between change in CDS spreads and good ratings news is negative while that between change in 
CDS spreads and bad ratings news is positive.17    
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
 
                                                     
16 To enhance the comparability of the results for testing our hypotheses, our cash flow forecast revision sample 
initially consists of observations with accompanying earnings forecast revisions. In section 4.2. Sensitivity Analyses 
we re-test H1b on a sample of observations with cash flow forecast revisions only.  
17 To verify analysts are not making forecast revisions in response to changes in CDS spreads we examine whether 
there is a significant correlation between changes in CDS spreads from days (-2,-1) and (-2,0)  and subsequent EFRs 
and CFRs. We fail to find evidence that analysts issue forecast revisions in response to short-window CDS spread 
movements and conclude reverse causality does not hinder the interpretation of our results in section 4.  
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4. Multivariate Results and Additional Analyses 
4.1. Regression Results  
 Prior to formally testing our hypotheses, we winsorize all continuous variables at the first 
and ninety-ninth percentiles to reduce the impact of outliers. All regression results reflect firm-
clustered standard errors and include controls for year fixed-effects.18 Regression results in 
Column A of Table 3 indicate support for Hypothesis 1a. EPS forecast revisions are negatively 
associated with changes in CDS spreads at the one per cent significance level (coefficient estimate 
= -0.486, t-statistic = -3.20). Upward (downward) analyst earnings revisions are associated with 
significantly lower (higher) CDS spreads over the five-day window of interest. Results for control 
variables are in line with predictions, with increased volatility in CDS spreads (σ(CDS)) and the 
market (ΔVIX) associated with larger spreads, and higher firm residual (RESIDRET) and market 
(SP500RET) returns associated with lower spreads. Good ratings news (GOODNEWS) is 
negatively associated with a change in CDS spreads while bad ratings news (BADNEWS) is 
positively associated with a change in CDS spreads, again as expected.19 
Support for hypothesis H1b is found in Column B of Table 3. The coefficient on CFR is 
negative (coefficient estimate = -1.224) and significant at the one per cent level (t-statistic = -3.35), 
indicating that revisions in forecast cash flow per share are also negatively associated with changes 
in CDS spreads over our five-day window.20 Results for control variables are nearly identical to 
                                                     
18 In untabulated analyses, we also control for industry fixed effects using binary indicators for the 48 industries 
identified by Fama and French (1997). The inclusion of industry controls does not affect our reported results. 
Furthermore, results are robust to clustering by industry (untabulated).  
19 Our results are unchanged if we instead limit our sample to the 94,433 observations with an earnings forecast 
revision but no cash flow forecast revision or the 31,932 observations with an accompanying cash flow forecast 
revision. Inferences drawn from Column A of Tables 4-6 remain unchanged if we limit our sample to these 31,932 
observations as well.  
20 We further explore whether upward or downward revisions are differentially priced and partition earnings and cash 
flow forecast revisions based on the sign of the revision. Re-estimating models (1a) and (1b), untabulated results 
indicate that the presence of both positive and negative earnings and cash flow forecast revisions are inversely related 
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those obtained in the estimation of model (1a).21 These results appear to be economically 
significant as well. A one-standard deviation increase in an earnings forecast revision will result 
in a CDS spread that falls by over half a per cent (1.276 * -0.486 = -0.620), which represents 1.2 
CDS basis points at the mean; if the average analyst cash flow per share forecast increases by one 
standard deviation, the CDS spread for the firm falls by over two percentage points (1.964 * -1.224 
= -2.404), which represents 4.7 basis points at the mean. The larger magnitude of the coefficient 
on CFR relative to that on EFR suggests support for hypothesis H1c, and we formally test this in 
the last column of Table 3.22  
As shown in Column C, when EFR and CFR are included in the model at the same time 
the coefficient estimate on CFR (-1.088) is nearly twice the magnitude of that on EFR (coefficient 
estimate of -0.521). Both continue to be significant as well (t-statistics of -1.90 and -2.86, 
respectively).23 A partial F-test provides support for H1c: the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient on CFR is statistically greater than EFR at the 10 per cent level, one-sided (F-statistic 
= 1.90, p-value = 0.08). Thus, on average, cash flow forecast revisions have a greater impact on 
the CDS market than do earnings forecast revisions. Interestingly, these findings differ from those 
                                                     
to CDS spreads at the one per cent level, with slightly larger coefficients observed on downward earnings and cash 
flow forecast revisions consistent with the greater downside risk borne by credit instrument holders. 
21 As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, in untabulated results we further control for lagged changes in CDS prices 
and residual stock returns calculated over the period [-5, -3] relative to the forecast announcement date. We also 
control for investment-grade CDS index prices (CDX) obtained from Bloomberg. Including CDX as a control modestly 
reduces sample sizes as it began trading in 2004. None of our reported results are affected by the inclusion of these 
controls. Additionally, we control for institutional ownership and interact institutional ownership with EFR and CFR. 
Results are robust to controlling for institutional ownership, while the absence of a significant coefficient on the 
interaction terms suggest the sensitivity of the CDS market to analyst forecasts is not affected by institutional 
ownership.  
22 Lok and Richardson (2011) note that using raw changes in spreads, as opposed to percentage changes, may be 
preferable at times. We re-run our analyses using raw changes in credit spreads and find very similar results. For 
example, the coefficient on CFR is negative (-0.030) and significant at the one per cent level (t = -2.81) when the raw 
change in credit spread is used as the dependent variable in Model 1a (untabuluated). Lok and Richardson’s (2011) 
comments also suggest that there may be instances where using the log of raw change may also be appropriate. We 
re-run our analyses using the natural log of raw change and again find robust evidence for our conclusions 
(untabulated). 
23 Including both EFR and CFR at the same time does not induce multicollinearity as evidenced by VIF values of 
approximately 1 for both variables (untabulated).  
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which examine the association between cash flow forecast revisions and equity prices, which find 
only a mild reaction to cash flow forecast revisions (Givoly et al., 2009) or an economically-
weaker association for cash flow forecast revisions than that which exists between earnings 
forecast revisions and abnormal equity returns (Call et al., 2013).  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 Table 4 presents the results of testing our second hypothesis regarding the impact of 
forecast revisions on CDS spreads for firms with “buy” or “strong buy” recommendations. The 
results in Column A of Table 4 show that the main effect of EFR is not significant when the 
interaction term between EPS revision and a buy/strong buy rating is included in the model (EFR 
coefficient estimate = -0.206, t-statistic = -1.17). However, the coefficient on the interaction term 
itself is negative and significant at the one per cent level (coefficient estimate = -1.451, t-statistic 
= -3.06). We reject our null hypothesis H2a and conclude that earnings forecast revisions matter 
primarily for firms with buy/strong buy ratings.24 Column B (test of H2b) examines the effect of 
“buy” ratings on the CDS market reaction to cash flow forecast revisions. Relative to Column A, 
inferences are reversed. A negative and significant coefficient on CFR (coefficient estimate = -
1.274, t-statistic = -2.66) indicates CPS forecast revisions are inversely associated with CDS 
spreads for firms with non-buy ratings. However, the coefficient estimate on the interaction term 
(CFR*BUY) is not significant (t-statistic = 0.23). This implies that cash flow forecasts are not 
valued differently for firms which analysts have given a buy/strong buy recommendation; 
therefore, we fail to reject our null hypothesis H2b. Taken as a whole, results from testing our 
second hypothesis suggest that a buy/strong buy recommendation is likely not a signal of an 
imprecise valuation measure to the CDS market. If it were such a signal, we would expect both 
                                                     
24 A partial F-test of the sum of the coefficients on EFR and EFR*BUY (untabulated) indicate that it is significantly 
different from zero at the one per cent level (F-statistic = 33.76, p-value <0.01).   
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earnings and cash flow data to behave similarly. Our pattern of results instead suggests that a 
buy/strong buy recommendation may instead be interpreted by the CDS market as a general 
reflection of underlying firm economic health. EFRs may matter more to the CDS market for firms 
in healthier financial conditions while CFRs may matter more for those in distressed conditions. 
We further explore this possible explanation through the testing of our third hypothesis.    
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 Table 5 examines the impact of analyst forecast revisions on the CDS market for firms with 
a non-investment grade credit rating. Column A of Table 5 shows the estimated coefficient on EFR 
is negative (-1.279), while that on EFR*JUNK is positive (1.408) in the estimation of model (3a). 
Both are significant at the one per cent level. A partial F-test indicates that the sum of the two 
coefficients is not significantly different from zero (F-statistic = 0.75, p-value = 0.39). We 
conclude that while earnings forecast revisions are negatively related with CDS spreads for 
investment-grade firms, this relationship disappears for firms with non-investment grade credit 
ratings; there is no net effect of an earnings forecast revision on CDS spreads for firms without an 
investment grade rating. However, the results from the estimation of model (3b) in Column B 
indicate that the relationship between cash flow forecast revisions and CDS spread changes is 
stronger for firms with non-investment grade credit ratings (coefficient estimate on CFR*JUNK = 
-2.589, t-statistic = -2.97), in support of H3a. The coefficient on CFR is not significant (t-statistic 
= -0.66) in this model.  
In Column C of Table 5 we simultaneously include EFR and CFR, along with the 
interaction of each with JUNK. We find that the coefficient on the CFR*JUNK term is negative 
and significant at the one per cent level (coefficient estimate = -2.812, t-statistic = -3.16) while 
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that on EFR*JUNK is not significant (t-statistic = 0.90).25 The evidence again supports hypothesis 
H3a: cash flow forecast revisions have a stronger negative effect on CDS spreads than earnings 
forecast revisions for firms with non-investment grade ratings. This pattern of results suggests the 
CDS market primarily values earnings forecast revisions for investment grade firms and cash flow 
forecast revisions for non-investment grade firms. There is no statistically significant effect of an 
earnings forecast revision on firms’ CDS spreads that have a non-investment grade rating, while 
the lack of a significant main effect on CFR demonstrates cash flow forecast revisions matter 
primarily for firms with a non-investment grade rating.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 Finally, Table 6 presents the results of the impact of the financial crisis on the CDS 
market’s response to analyst forecast revisions.26 The results of estimating model (4a) in Column 
A of the table indicate that the coefficient on EFR*CRISIS is not statistically significant. However, 
results in Column B from estimating model (4b) provide evidence that the CDS market did become 
more sensitive to cash flows during the financial crisis: the coefficients on CFR and CFR*CRISIS 
are both negative and significant (coefficient estimates of -0.885 and -1.959, t-statistics of -2.23 
and -2.08, respectively) in Column B of the table. These findings provide initial support for 
hypothesis H3b.27 Examining the results in Column C of the estimation of model (4c), where EPS 
                                                     
25 In Column C, though the coefficient on EFR is negative and significant (coefficient estimate = -0.779, t-statistic = 
-2.17) while that on EFR*JUNK is positive and not significant (coefficient estimate = 0.521, t-statistic = 0.90), a 
partial F-test indicates the sum of the coefficients is not significantly different from zero (F-statistic = 0.58, p-value = 
0.45); thus inferences regarding the impact of EPS revisions for firms with non-investment grade credit ratings as 
established through the estimation of model (3a) in Column A are unchanged.  
26 As the inclusion of year controls and the CRISIS indicator variable may induce multicollinearity, for all regressions 
in Table 6 we exclude year indicator variables for the crisis period while retaining other year indicator variables. 
Inferences are unchanged if we include crisis-period year controls, or exclude all year controls (untabulated). 
27 Alternatively, we model the effect of CRISIS by creating Pre-crisis, Crisis, and Post-Crisis sub-samples. Results are 
consistent with our interaction modelling. Namely, the coefficient on EFR is consistently negative and significant 
across all three periods with similar coefficients. The coefficient on CFR is also consistently negative and significant, 
but jumps in magnitude during the crisis periods; Pre-crisis and Post-Crisis coefficients are similar in size.   
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and CPS revisions are included at the same time along with the interaction of each with CRISIS, 
we find that the coefficient on the CFR*CRISIS term is negative and significantly different from 
zero at the five per cent level (coefficient estimate = -1.923, t-statistic = -2.03) while that on 
EFR*CRISIS is positive but not significant (t-statistic = 0.16).28 Hypothesis H3b is thus again 
supported. During the financial crisis the CDS market was more responsive to the cash flow 
forecast revisions of analysts than earnings forecast revisions.  
(Insert Table 6 here) 
Taking the results of testing H2 and H3 together, we observe cash flow forecast revisions 
matter more than earnings forecast revisions when firms tend to be in weaker economic health. Per 
Tables 5 and 6, the CDS market appears to react more to earnings forecast revisions when firms 
have an investment grade rating and during non-crisis periods. For firms with non-investment 
grade ratings and during the financial crisis, the impact of EPS forecast revisions is much reduced. 
In Table 5, in fact, the coefficients on EFR and EFR*JUNK are of opposite signs and a test of the 
sum of the coefficients reveals it is not statistically different than zero. In Table 6 the story is very 
similar, whereby EFR and EFR*CRISIS have coefficients of opposite signs (although a partial F-
test reveals the sum is still negative and statistically different than zero, the significance level drops 
to marginal). Tables 5 and 6 also reveal that cash flow forecast revisions are more important to the 
CDS market for non-investment grade firms and for all companies during the financial crisis as 
evidenced by the negative and significant coefficients on CFR*JUNK and CFR*CRISIS. Typically 
the impact of earnings information is found to be more important for firms with a shorter distance 
to default (Lok and Richardson, 2011). A possible explanation to this unexpected result may be 
that the usual CDS-earnings relationship in shorter distance-to-default situations can break down 
                                                     
28 We note that the main effect of CRISIS is not significant in Columns B and C due to the reduced sample size relative 
to Column A. 
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in the presence of more-precise cash flow information. Overall, in contrast to the findings from 
the equity market, results of our tests lead us to conclude that the CDS market values cash flow 
forecast revisions more than earnings forecast revisions on average as evidenced by larger 
coefficient estimates on CFR relative to EFR in Table 3, and that this relationship strengthens as 
firms’ financial condition worsens or when the business cycle is in a trough phase (Tables 4 – 6).  
4.2. Sensitivity Analyses 
 
 In additional analyses, we test the sensitivity of our primary results to alternative CDS 
contract maturities. We re-estimate models (1a-1c) to test the relationship between forecast 
revisions and changes in CDS spreads for contracts of one, three, seven, and ten years. Results are 
tabulated in Table 7. The results in Columns A and B indicate that EPS forecast revisions and CPS 
forecast revisions remain significant at the one per cent level for all alternative maturities. Column 
C re-estimates model (1c), which includes simultaneous earnings and cash flow forecast revisions. 
When we include both terms in the regression equation, CFR is significant in all four alternative 
contract lengths, while EFR is significant in three of the four. Similar to our findings in Table 3 
for five-year maturity contracts, the coefficient estimates for CFR are approximately two times 
larger (and more strongly significant) than EFR across the alternative maturities as well, indicating 
the continued economic importance of cash flow forecast revisions.   
(Insert Table 7 here) 
We also explore the impact of CDS liquidity on our results. We re-perform our analyses 
on high-depth and low-depth contracts, split at the median depth of 5. We find that our primary 
results continue to hold in both subsamples, albeit with slightly smaller coefficients and at weaker 
significance levels for the low-depth subsample. This is intuitive as a lack of trading limits the 
ability of spreads to reflect new information. In the low-depth sample, we observe a coefficient 
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estimate of -0.394 (t = -2.04, significant at the five per cent level) on EFR and an estimate of -
0.980 (t = -1.98, significant at the five per cent level) on CFR (untabulated), each smaller in 
magnitude than the corresponding coefficient reported in Table 3. For our high-depth subsample, 
coefficient estimates on EFR and CFR are larger than reported in the original estimation of models 
1a and 1b (-0.646 and -1.472, respectively), each significant at the one per cent level (untabulated). 
That this finding is what one would expect to observe if the CDS market were responding to analyst 
forecast revisions lends further support to our main hypotheses. 
 Relatedly, if our theory is correct in that the CDS market responds to analyst forecast 
revisions, then the timing of forecast revisions may be expected to generate differing observed 
CDS market reactions. Specifically, we investigate whether forecast revisions made on 
consecutive days but in different directions (i.e., an upward [downward] revision on the first day 
and a downward [upward] on the second) tend to offset each other. Since the five-day market-
reaction window partially covers both forecast revisions, intuition suggests the market response to 
both forecast revisions should be muted for these observations. To test whether this effect occurs, 
we analyze our sample and remove all observations consisting of revisions made on consecutive 
days with opposite signs. We find this phenomenon to be fairly rare; our sample falls by 7 per cent 
to 117,181 in the earnings forecast revision sample and by 15 per cent to 27,095 in the cash flow 
forecast revision sample. Ex ante, we predict coefficients on EFR and CFR that are larger in 
magnitude for these reduced samples in the estimation of Models (1a) and (1b). Our results are 
consistent with this prediction: we observe coefficient estimates of -0.501 on EFR and -1.658 on 
CFR, each significant at the one per cent level (untabulated). We interpret the results of this test 
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as additional evidence in favor of our hypothesis that the CDS market responds to analyst forecast 
revisions.29 
While we carefully construct our models to control for correlated omitted variables, it is 
possible that other confounding events may drive our observed results. One type of event which 
may be expected to move markets is the release of actual earnings information. To ensure our 
results are not driven by earnings announcements, we re-perform our primary analyses using a 
sample which excludes forecast revisions made during a five-day window around actual earnings 
announcement dates. This exclusion criteria affects a relatively small number of observations, with 
1,452 revision-days (1.1 per cent) falling within announcement windows for the earnings forecast 
revision sample and 226 observations (0.7 per cent) for the cash flow forecast revision sample. 
Results (untabulated) are unaffected and continue to hold at the same significance levels when 
these observations are removed from the sample (EFR coefficient estimate = -0.501, t-statistic = -
3.27; CFR coefficient estimate = -1.215, t-statistic = -3.29). These tests further suggest that the 
observed results are not a spurious reflection of confounding events.  
Finally, to test the specific effects of cash flow forecast revisions and strengthen our 
findings regarding their relative importance, we re-estimate model (1b) on a sample of 7,119 
observations that consist exclusively of cash flow forecast revisions; that is, these observations do 
not contain a corresponding earnings forecast revision. Untabulated results indicate that the effect 
of cash flow forecast revisions in this sample are also negatively associated with changes in CDS 
spreads (coefficient estimate = -0.752) and statistically significant at the ten per cent level (t-
statistic = -1.72). Even in a much-reduced sample, we find cash flow forecast revisions are 
inversely related to changes in the CDS market, independent of changes in EPS forecast revisions.   
                                                     
29 In untabulated analyses we do not observe that forecast revision horizon (the time between the release of a 
forecast revision and fiscal year end) impacts the CDS market’s reaction to forecast issuance.  
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4.3. Effect of Analyst Recommendation Changes 
 
The literature on the importance of the issuance and revision of analyst recommendations 
is mixed. Some studies find that the issuance of analysts’ recommendations and recommendation 
changes have equity market impacts (e.g., Womack, 1996; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Cornett et 
al., 2007; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2009), while others question their usefulness (e.g., Simon and 
Curtis, 2011; Ertimur et al. 2011, Brown and Huang, 2013). We examine the impact of analyst 
recommendation changes on the CDS market. Results (untabulated) indicate recommendation 
changes are not significantly associated with movements in CDS spreads. While significantly 
responding to analysts’ forecast revisions, the CDS market does not appear to immediately react 
to recommendation changes. This suggests that the CDS market discriminates between various 
types of analyst output and that the price discovery process in the CDS market absorbs information 
from various types of analyst output to differing degrees. This is consistent with the notion that 
that earnings forecasts and revisions are more directed at large, sophisticated investors while 
recommendations are targeted at retail investors (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 2014).  
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 In this study, we document the impact of financial analysts’ output revisions on CDS 
spreads. Prior literature shows that analysts impact both equity and bond markets through their 
ability to provide new information regarding future earnings and cash flows. Though existing 
equity market research on cash flow forecast revisions tends to show they are less important than 
earnings forecast revisions, we predict that the opposite relation may hold in the CDS market. Our 
findings support this conjecture and indicate that while both earnings and cash flow forecast 
revisions are informative to the CDS market, on average cash flow forecasts are significantly more 
so. Existing literature demonstrates that news regarding earnings forecast revisions matters more 
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in equity markets for firms with “buy” recommendations. We find the CDS spreads of buy/strong 
buy recommendation-firms react more to earnings forecast revisions, but not to cash flow forecast 
revisions. Examining the differential impact of cash flow forecast revisions and earnings forecast 
revisions for firms with non-investment grade credit ratings, and for all firms during the recent 
financial crisis, we find cash flow forecast revisions are more important than those for earnings in 
both situations. In addition, we find analysts’ recommendation revisions are not (at least 
immediately) informative to the CDS market. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing further evidence of the importance of 
financial analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts outside the traditional domain of equity prices. 
We demonstrate that individual security market analysts provide new and useful information to 
the CDS market and a continuing effect of analysts on credit spreads, aside from the impact of 
analysts and their forecasts on initial bond yields documented in prior studies (e.g., Khurana and 
Raman, 2003; Edmonds et al., 2011). Our results also shed light on the varying importance of 
revisions in earnings and cash flow forecasts to the CDS market. In general, our findings show 
earnings forecast revisions are more important for firms in better financial positions while cash 
flow revisions tend to dominate as firms’ financial health weakens. In contrast to the findings of 
prior literature examining equity markets, we also provide evidence that analysts’ cash flow 
forecasts can be more important than earnings forecasts in credit markets. Finally, we show that 
all types of analyst output are not treated equally by the CDS market: unlike forecast revisions, 
recommendation changes do not elicit an immediate price reaction.    
 Future research may wish to examine how CDS spreads are impacted by other types of 
analyst activity, such as the issuance of long term growth forecasts and the initiation and cessation 
of coverage. It may also be fruitful to more closely examine the effects of specific analyst and 
26 
 
brokerage attributes in the CDS market, as well as “innovative” or “bold” forecasts relative to 
forecasts which represent herding behavior. Finally, the specific conditions under which the 
market responds differentially to cash flow and earnings forecasts warrants additional attention. 
For example, while in untabulated analyses we do not find that accrual quality impacts the CDS 
market’s reaction to forecast revisions, this question may be more fully examined in deeper equity 
markets. Exploring topics such as these will assist market participants and academics in developing 
a fuller understanding of the relationship between analysts and markets.  
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics: Sample Period 2001 – 2012 
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Med. Q3 Max 
CDS 126,365 196.297 387.691 2.494 44.590 86.728 198.828 17,532.557 
ΔCDS 126,365 0.005 0.120 -1.380 -0.003 -0.001 0.316 10.790 
EFR 126,365 -0.004 1.276 -151.000 -0.033 0.000 0.029 169.000 
CFR 31,932 0.033 1.964 -74.000 -0.024 0.001 0.026 167.647 
RECREV 27,061 -0.035 1.484 -4.000 -1.000 -1.000 1.000 4.000 
MeanRec 126,365 3.632 0.413 1.200 3.370 3.680 3.930 5.000 
σ(CDS) 126,365 8.544 15.805 0.106 4.435 6.356 9.655 1,048.31 
σ(RET) 126,365 0.019 0.011 0.005 0.012 0.016 0.022 0.308 
RESIDRET 126,365 0.001 0.063 -1.654 -0.012 0.001 0.027 3.252 
SP500RET 126,365 0.001 0.029 -0.197 -0.012 0.003 0.016 0.179 
ΔTREAS 126,365 0.036 0.609 -1.000 -0.032 0.000 0.034 26.000 
ΔVIX 126,365 0.009 0.125 -0.348 -0.068 -0.006 0.068 1.028 
GOODNEWS 126,365 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
BADNEWS 126,365 0.001 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
         
CDS is the raw spread in basis points. ΔCDS is the percentage change in CDS spreads for firm j at time t over a five-day window 
around the revision date adjusted for the average percentage change in spread for all CDS sample observations with the same 
implied rating our sample. EFR is the average daily analyst forecasted earnings per share revision expressed as a percentage and 
CFR is the average daily analyst forecasted cash flow per share revision for firm j at time t expressed as a percentage. RECREV 
is average analyst recommendation revision for firm j at time t. MeanRec is the consensus recommendation from I/B/E/S recoded 
so that “5” represents strong buy and “1” represents strong sell. σ(CDS) is the standard deviation of the firm’s CDS Spread and 
σ(RET) is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted stock returns calculated over the event period [-137, -6] relative to the 
revision date. RESIDRET is the market-adjusted return as well over the five day period surrounding the revision date. SP500RET 
is the cumulative return in the S&P 500 index, ΔTREAS is the percentage change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, ΔVIX is 
the change in the S&P 500 implied volatility index over the five-day window. GOODNEWS (BADNEWS) is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of 1 if the firm of interest experiences an actual credit rating upgrade (downgrade), is placed on ratings watch 
positive (negative), or receives a positive (negative) outlook on the event day.  
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix of Selected Variables: Pearson (Above Diagonal) and Spearman (Below Diagonal) 
 
 
 
 ΔCDS EFR CFR RECREV σ(CDS) σ(RET) RESIDRET SP500RET ΔTREAS ΔVIX GOODNEWS BADNEWS 
ΔCDS  -0.004 
(0.1959) 
-0.014 
(0.0128) 
-0.050 
(<.0001) 
0.042 
(<.0001) 
0.010 
(0.0003) 
-0.1196 
(<.0001) 
-0.033 
(<.0001) 
-0.006 
(0.0315) 
0.029 
(<.0001) 
-0.005 
(0.0636) 
0.042 
(<.001) 
EFR 
 
-0.056 
(<.0001) 
 0.003 
(0.5591) 
0.020 
(<.0001) 
-0.005 
(0.0763) 
-0.002 
(0.5279) 
0.018 
(<.0001) 
0.002 
(0.5235) 
-0.001 
(0.6909) 
0.002 
(0.3888) 
-0.000 
(0.9516) 
-0.003 
(0.2845) 
CFR -0.048 
(<.0001) 
0.545 
(<.0001) 
 0.016 
(0.0023) 
-0.003 
(0.6400) 
0.018 
(0.0016) 
0.025 
(<.0001) 
0.018 
(0.0011) 
0.001 
(0.9233) 
-0.001 
(0.7998) 
-0.000 
(0.9775) 
-0.009 
(0.0960) 
RECREV -0.042 
(<.0001) 
0.239 
(<.0001) 
0.170 
(<.0001) 
 -0.006 
(0.3601) 
-0.023 
(0.0002) 
0.231 
(<.0001) 
-0.005 
(0.4084) 
0.034 
(<.0001) 
-0.027 
(<.0001) 
0.007 
(0.2336) 
-0.021 
(0.0005) 
σ(CDS) -0.009 
(0.0008) 
-0.049 
(<.0001) 
-0.009 
(0.1062) 
-0.021 
(0.0006) 
 0.143 
(<.0001) 
0.010 
(0.0004) 
0.000 
(0.9174) 
-0.005 
(0.0636) 
-0.009 
(0.0025) 
-0.001 
(0.6467) 
0.020 
(<.0001) 
σ(RET) -0.001 
(0.7557) 
-0.083 
(<.0001) 
-0.064 
(<.0001) 
-0.025 
(<.0001) 
0.294 
(<.0001) 
 0.021 
(<.0001) 
0.010 
(0.0005) 
0.010 
(0.0002) 
-0.033 
(<.0001) 
0.000 
(0.8898) 
0.016 
(<.0001) 
RESIDRET -0.116 
(<.0001) 
0.163 
(<.0001) 
0.135 
(<.0001) 
0.299 
(<.0001) 
0.000 
(0.9762) 
-0.005 
(0.0563) 
 0.113 
(<.0001) 
0.009 
(0.0016) 
-0.066 
(<.0001) 
0.003 
(0.2924) 
-0.034 
(<.0001) 
SP500RET -0.018 
(<.0001) 
-0.004 
(0.1835) 
-0.010 
(0.0728) 
-0.011 
(0.0816) 
-0.007 
(0.0083) 
0.007 
(0.0134) 
-0.071 
(<.0001) 
 0.025 
(<.0001) 
-0.627 
(<.0001) 
0.001 
(0.6243) 
-0.005 
(0.0812) 
ΔTREAS -0.006 
(0.0435) 
0.015 
(<.0001) 
0.011 
(0.0404) 
0.005 
(0.4182) 
-0.036 
(<.0001) 
-0.059 
(<.0001) 
-0.002 
(0.4956) 
0.040 
(<.0001) 
 -0.032 
(<.0001) 
-0.001 
(0.7103) 
-.000 
(0.9416) 
ΔVIX 0.016 
(<.0001) 
0.019 
(<.0001) 
0.018 
(0.0010) 
-0.025 
(<.0001) 
-0.011 
(<.0001) 
-0.031 
(<.0001) 
-0.050 
(<.0001) 
-0.624 
(<.0001 
-0.032 
(<.0001) 
 0.003 
(0.3668) 
0.002 
(0.5294) 
GOODNEWS -0.005 
(0.0746) 
0.007 
(0.0090) 
0.006 
(0.2946) 
0.006 
(0.3300) 
-0.005 
(0.0764) 
0.000 
(0.9333) 
0.003 
(0.2604) 
0.002 
(0.4255) 
-0.001 
(0.6595) 
0.002 
(0.4200) 
 -0.001 
(0.7917) 
BADNEWS 0.026 
(<.0001) 
-0.020 
(<.0001) 
-0.014 
(0.0120) 
-0.021 
(0.0006) 
0.022 
(<.0001) 
0.011 
(0.0002) 
-0.016 
(<.0001) 
-0.005 
(0.0898) 
-0.000 
(0.9794) 
0.005 
(0.0800) 
-0.001 
(0.7917) 
 
p-values in parentheses. See Table 1 for variable definitions.  
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Table 3 
Regression Results: Effect of Earnings and Cash Flow Forecast Revisions  
Test of Hypothesis 1 
Dependent Variable: ΔCDS 
Column  A B C 
     
 Predicted Sign Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  1.107 
(3.90) 
*** 2.204 
(2.43) 
** 2.203 
(2.43) 
** 
EFR - -0.486 
(-3.20) 
***   -0.521 
(-1.90) 
* 
CFR -   -1.224 
(-3.35) 
*** -1.088 
(-2.86) 
*** 
σ(CDS) + 0.013 
(1.91) 
* 0.015 
(1.19) 
 0.015 
(1.18) 
 
σ(RET) + -4.116 
(-1.09) 
 2.884 
(0.42) 
 2.529 
(0.37) 
 
RESIDRET - -20.609 
(-18.14) 
*** -18.880 
(-12.19) 
*** -18.756 
(-12.02) 
*** 
SP500RET - -4.412 
(-1.91) 
* -8.523 
(-2.58) 
** -8.612 
(-2.60) 
*** 
ΔTREAS - -0.097 
(-1.06) 
 -0.067 
(-0.44) 
 -0.068 
(-0.44) 
 
ΔVIX + 1.051 
(3.06) 
*** 1.156 
(1.89) 
* 1.151 
(1.88) 
* 
GOODNEWS - -2.267 
(-2.46) 
** -4.337 
(-2.24) 
** -4.360 
(-2.24) 
** 
BADNEWS + 7.500 
(6.58) 
*** 8.229 
(3.76) 
*** 8.174 
(3.73) 
*** 
      (F-statistic)  
Partial F-test (β1 = β2 )                (1.90) † 
        
Year Controls?  Included  Included  Included  
N  126,365  31,932  31,932  
Adj. R2  0.024  0.027  0.028  
        
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm 
level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively (two-sided). † indicates 
significance at the 10% level (one-sided). ΔCDS is the percentage change in CDS spreads for firm j at time t over 
a five-day window around the revision date adjusted for the average percentage change in spread for all CDS 
sample observations with the same implied rating our sample. EFR is the average daily analyst forecasted earnings 
per share revision and CFR is the average daily analyst forecasted cash flow per share revision for firm j at time t 
expressed as a percentage, expressed as percentages. σ(CDS) is the standard deviation of the firm’s CDS Spread 
and σ(RET) is the standard deviation of the market-adjusted stock returns calculated over the event period [-137, 
-6] relative to the revision date. RESIDRET is the market-adjusted return as well over the five day period 
surrounding the revision date. SP500RET is the cumulative return in the S&P 500 index, ΔTREAS is the percentage 
change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, ΔVIX is the change in the S&P 500 implied volatility index over the 
five-day window. GOODNEWS (BADNEWS) is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm of interest 
experiences an actual credit rating upgrade (downgrade), is placed on ratings watch positive (negative), or receives 
a positive (negative) outlook on the event day. Coefficient estimates multiplied by 100 for ease of exposition. 
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Table 4 
Regression Results: Test of Buy Recommendations   
Test of Hypothesis 2 
Dependent Variable: ΔCDS 
Column  A B 
    
 Predicted Sign Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  1.244 
(4.32) 
*** 2.324 
(2.54) 
** 
EFR - -0.206 
(-1.17) 
   
EFR*BUY - -1.451 
(-3.06) 
***   
CFR -   -1.274 
(-2.66) 
*** 
CFR*BUY -   0.204 
(0.23) 
 
BUY - -0.185 
(-3.56) 
*** -0.129 
(-1.51) 
 
σ(CDS) + 0.012 
(1.88) 
* 0.015 
(1.20) 
 
σ(RET) + -5.346 
(-1.39) 
 2.683 
(0.39) 
 
RESIDRET - -20.468 
(-18.02) 
*** -18.858 
(-12.16) 
*** 
SP500RET - -4.422 
(-1.92) 
* -8.503 
(-2.57) 
** 
ΔTREAS - -0.097 
(-1.06) 
 -0.065 
(-0.43) 
 
ΔVIX + 1.052 
(3.06) 
*** 1.156 
(1.90) 
* 
GOODNEWS - -2.219 
(-2.40) 
** -4.330 
(-2.23) 
** 
BADNEWS + 7.468 
(6.55) 
*** 8.188 
(3.74) 
*** 
      
Year Controls?  Included  Included  
N  126,365  31,932  
Adj. R2  0.025  0.027  
      
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm level. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. ΔCDS is the percentage change in CDS 
spreads for firm j at time t over a five-day window around the revision date adjusted for the average percentage change in 
spread for all CDS sample observations with the same implied rating our sample. EFR is the average daily analyst 
forecasted earnings per share revision and CFR is the average daily analyst forecasted cash flow per share revision for 
firm j at time t expressed as percentages. BUY is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if an observation has a Buy/Strong 
Buy analyst rating. σ(CDS) is the standard deviation of the firm’s CDS Spread and σ(RET) is the standard deviation of the 
market-adjusted stock returns calculated over the event period [-137, -6] relative to the revision date. RESIDRET is the 
market-adjusted return as well over the five day period surrounding the revision date. SP500RET is the cumulative return 
in the S&P 500 index, ΔTREAS is the percentage change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, ΔVIX is the change in the 
S&P 500 implied volatility index over the five-day window. GOODNEWS (BADNEWS) is an indicator variable that takes 
a value of 1 if the firm of interest experiences an actual credit rating upgrade (downgrade), is placed on ratings watch 
positive (negative), or receives a positive (negative) outlook on event day. Coefficient estimates multiplied by 100 for 
ease of exposition.  
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Table 5 
Regression Results: Test of Non-investment Grade Ratings   
Test of Hypothesis 3a 
Dependent Variable: ΔCDS 
Column  A B C 
     
 Predicted Sign Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  1.105 
(3.88) 
*** 2.348 
(2.55) 
** 2.347 
(2.55) 
** 
EFR - -1.279 
(-5.30) 
***   -0.779 
(-2.17) 
** 
EFR*JUNK - 1.408 
(3.85) 
***   0.521 
(0.90) 
 
CFR -   -0.261 
(-0.66) 
 -0.026 
(-0.07) 
 
CFR*JUNK -   -2.589 
(-2.97) 
*** -2.812 
(-3.16) 
*** 
JUNK + 0.052 
(0.75) 
 0.135 
(1.36) 
 0.130 
(1.32) 
 
σ(CDS) + 0.012 
(1.86) 
* 0.013 
(1.05) 
 0.013 
(1.04) 
 
σ(RET) + -5.377 
(-1.29) 
 -1.416 
(-0.19) 
 -1.757 
(-0.24) 
 
RESIDRET - -20.550 
(-18.12) 
*** -18.780 
(-12.16) 
*** -18.644 
(-11.99) 
*** 
SP500RET - -4.429 
(-1.92) 
* -8.645 
(-2.62) 
*** -8.734 
(-2.64) 
** 
ΔTREAS - -0.098 
(-1.07) 
 -0.062 
(-0.41) 
 -0.063 
(-0.41) 
 
ΔVIX + 1.052 
(3.06) 
*** 1.118 
(1.83) 
* 1.117 
(1.83) 
* 
GOODNEWS - -2.276 
(-2.48) 
** -4.326 
(-2.25) 
** -4.346 
(-2.26) 
** 
BADNEWS + 7.507 
(6.59) 
*** 8.236 
(3.79) 
*** 8.180 
(3.76) 
*** 
        
Year Controls?  Included  Included  Included  
N  126,365  31,932  31,932  
Adj. R2  0.025  0.027  0.027  
        
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm level. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. ΔCDS is the percentage change in CDS 
spreads for firm j at time t over a five-day window around the revision date adjusted for the average percentage change in 
spread for all CDS sample observations with the same implied rating our sample. EFR is the average daily analyst 
forecasted earnings per share revision and CFR is the average daily analyst forecasted cash flow per share revision for 
firm j at time t expressed as percentages. JUNK is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if an observation has a non-
investment grade credit rating. σ(CDS) is the standard deviation of the firm’s CDS Spread and σ(RET) is the standard 
deviation of the market-adjusted stock returns calculated over the event period [-137, -6] relative to the revision date. 
RESIDRET is the market-adjusted return as well over the five day period surrounding the revision date. SP500RET is the 
cumulative return in the S&P 500 index, ΔTREAS is the percentage change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, ΔVIX is 
the change in the S&P 500 implied volatility index over the five-day window. GOODNEWS (BADNEWS) is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm of interest experiences an actual credit rating upgrade (downgrade), is placed on 
ratings watch positive (negative), or receives a positive (negative) outlook on event day. Coefficient estimates multiplied 
by 100 for ease of exposition. 
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Table 6 
Regression Results: Test of Crisis Period   
Test of Hypothesis 3b  
Dependent Variable: ΔCDS 
Column  A B C 
        
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept  1.106 
(3.88) 
*** 2.218 
(2.44) 
** 2.216 
(2.44) 
** 
EFR - -0.515 
(-3.28) 
***   -0.514 
(-1.92) 
* 
EFR*CRISIS - 0.145 
(0.33) 
   0.146 
(0.16) 
 
CFR -   -0.885 
(-2.23) 
** -0.768 
(-1.91) 
* 
CFR*CRISIS -   -1.959 
(-2.08) 
** -1.923 
(-2.03) 
** 
CRISIS + 
 
0.425 
(2.65) 
*** 0.029 
(0.08) 
 0.029 
(0.08) 
 
σ(CDS) + 0.013 
(1.90) 
* 0.015 
(1.18) 
 0.015 
(1.17) 
 
σ(RET) + -4.499 
(-1.20) 
 2.723 
(0.40) 
 2.374 
(0.35) 
 
RESIDRET - -20.611 
(-18.14) 
*** -18.847 
(-12.13) 
*** -18.733 
(-11.96) 
*** 
SP500RET - -4.142 
(-1.80) 
* -8.869 
(-2.58) 
** -8.653 
(-2.60) 
*** 
ΔTREAS - -0.106 
(-1.15) 
 -0.067 
(-0.44) 
 -0.069 
(-0.45) 
 
ΔVIX + 1.070 
(3.11) 
*** 1.137 
(1.85) 
* 1.132 
(1.85) 
* 
GOODNEWS - -2.271 
(-2.46) 
** -4.341 
(-2.24) 
** -4.363 
(-2.24) 
** 
BADNEWS + 7.506 
(6.59) 
*** 8.209 
(3.73) 
*** 8.158 
(3.70) 
*** 
        
Year Controls?  Included  Included  Included  
N  126,365  31,932  31,932  
Adj. R2  0.025  0.027  0.027  
        
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect clustering at the firm level. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. ΔCDS is the percentage change in CDS 
spreads for firm j at time t over a five-day window around the revision date adjusted for the average percentage change in 
spread for all CDS sample observations with the same implied rating our sample. EFR is the average daily analyst 
forecasted earnings per share revision and CFR is the average daily analyst forecasted cash flow per share revision for 
firm j at time t expressed as percentages. CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if an observation occurs 
between Q4 2007 and Q3 2009. σ(CDS) is the standard deviation of the firm’s CDS Spread and σ(RET) is the standard 
deviation of the market-adjusted stock returns calculated over the event period [-137, -6] relative to the revision date. 
RESIDRET is the market-adjusted return as well over the five day period surrounding the revision date. SP500RET is the 
cumulative return in the S&P 500 index, ΔTREAS is the percentage change in the three-month Treasury bill rate, ΔVIX is 
the change in the S&P 500 implied volatility index over the five-day window. GOODNEWS (BADNEWS) is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm of interest experiences an actual credit rating upgrade (downgrade), is placed on 
ratings watch positive (negative), or receives a positive (negative) outlook on event day. Coefficient estimates multiplied 
by 100 for ease of exposition. 
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Table 7 
Regression Results: Test of Alternative Maturities 
 
Dependent Variable: ΔCDS 
Column  A B C 
Variable  EFR CFR EFR CFR 
      
 Predicted 
Sign 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
Coeff. Est. 
(t-statistic) 
1-Year CDS - -0.862 
(-3.09) 
*** -2.095 
(-3.00) 
*** -1.025 
(-1.83) 
* -1.843 
(-2.55) 
** 
3-Year CDS - -0.702 
(-3.98) 
*** -1.566 
(-3.65) 
*** -0.623 
(-2.04) 
** -1.405 
(-3.13) 
*** 
7-Year CDS - -0.526 
(-3.92) 
*** -0.973 
(-3.05) 
*** -0.450 
(-1.58) 
 -0.858 
(-2.49) 
** 
10-Year CDS - -0.561 
(-3.92) 
*** -1.051 
(-2.95) 
*** -0.542 
(-1.75) 
* -0.913 
(-2.39) 
** 
        
The table above reflects the running of models 1a, 1b, and 1c across various maturities. All controls from (1a-c) are included 
but omitted for conciseness. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors reflect 
clustering at the firm level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Coefficient estimates 
multiplied by 100 for ease of exposition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
